Commentary--Funding the Federal Judiciary by Slack, John M.
Volume 82 | Issue 1 Article 3
September 1979
Commentary--Funding the Federal Judiciary
John M. Slack
United States Congress
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Slack, Commentary--Funding the Federal Judiciary, 82 W. Va. L. Rev. (1979).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss1/3
West Virginia Law Review
Volume 82 Fall 1979 Number 1
COMMENTARY-FUNDING THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY
JOHN M. SLACK*
Congress and the entire nation today face the undeniable need
to impose rationality and prudence on the allocation of public
funds. The functions of government that most need support must
be identified before the requisite funds are allocated. The appro-
priations process is the means by which Congress makes these
determinations.
The appropriations process for executive branch agencies is
well-illumined in the press, and has been the subject of scholarly
analysis. Yet, while the judicial branch is vital to a free society,
few citizens, indeed few lawyers, are at all familiar with the pro-
cesses by which funds are provided for the operation of the judici-
ary.
As will be developed more fully in this commentary, some
courts, relying on their inherent powers, have mandated the ex-
penditure of funds beyond those appropriated to them, considering
these additional funds to be essential to their proper operation.
Regardless of the outcome, such judicial exercises are not exem-
plary but are illustrative of a breakdown in the appropriations
process. Inevitably, they become the subject of prominent treat-
ment in the daily press. The resulting cases present interesting,
challenging questions of law, and generate scholarly comment,
much of it critical.
Whatever view one takes of the inherent power of a court, and
on this issue both judges and scholars are divided, there is unanim-
ity in the opinion that "judicial appropriation by judicial man-
date" is hardly a desirable procedure. Fortunately, there have been
few such instances and none have occurred in the federal system.
* United States Congressman, 3d District, West Virginia. Chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary and Re-
lated Agencies of the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee.
1
Slack: Commentary--Funding the Federal Judiciary
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The publicity accorded these cases has not, however, brought at-
tention to the judicial appropriations process; rather, it has fo-
cused only on the aberrations. If anything, these "pathological
cases" serve to emphasize the need for better understanding of how
the appropriations process should work and how it normally does
work, at least on the federal level.
Perhaps the appropriations process for the courts has not been
illumined because of the very small percentage of the total govern-
ment appropriations dollar that is consumed by the judicial
branch. The federal judicial budget request for fiscal year 1979, for
example, was $491,755,000; of the total federal budget request, it
was less than one tenth of one percent.' Comparable figures will
be found in the states.
These percentages, however, do not mirror in any way the co-
equal role played by the judiciary in our tripartite system of sepa-
rated powers. The importance of the judicial function makes it
necessary to understand the process by which the legislature ap-
propriates monies for the operation of the courts. This commentary
will analyze an appropriation process that works especially well,
the funding of the federal judicial system.
By way of introduction, it should be noted that the federal
judicial budget contains the essential elements of the judicial
budgeting process long recommended by careful students of court
organization and judicial reform. 2 That is to say, it is a unified
judicial budgeting system. The budget is prepared for submission
to a central funding source-the Congress. Funding for the courts
is not split among central and local authorities, as is true in the
great majority of states.3
Moreover, the preparation and administration of the judicial
budget is judicially controlled. There is no executive interference
in the preparation or submission of the judicial budget; the federal
courts' budget is prepared in one central source, the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, under the direction of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which is the administra-
I For a complete listing of the federal budget, see OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATEs GoVERNMENT, 1979.
2Hazard, McNamara & Sentilles, Unitary Financing and Court Budgeting, 81
YALE L.J. 1286 (1972).
3 See Bear, The Limited Trend Toward State Court Financing, 58 JUD. 322
(1975).
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tive policymaking body for the federal courts.' While the law al-
lows the Office of Management and Budget to comment upon the
federal judicial budget request,5 this author is unaware that the
executive branch has ever used this limited authority. This proce-
dure stands in marked contrast to the situation in over half the
states, where the executive branch may revise the judicial budget
request before it is submitted to the legislature.' This judicial au-
tonomy in formulating a budget is vital to the separatioh of pow-
ers.
These circumstances suggest at least three reasons why it is
important to discuss the federal judicial appropriations process.
First, a review of the federal judicial appropriations process reveals
the advantages of a judicial appropriations and budgeting system
structured to allow the courts and the legislature the opportunity
to consider the total judicial budget in a careful and rational man-
ner. It is a process by which judicial personnel, through internal
analysis, discussion, and professional staff back-up, determine
what resources are needed to operate the courts. The justification
for the federal judicial budget is carefully considered by the Con-
gress, which through its committees and subcommittees, can ex-
plore the judiciary's needs in conjunction with judges familiar with
the total federal judicial budget. This procedure allows for compro-
mise and negotiation based upon rational considerations and a
view of the total picture.
This capability for system-wide analysis has meant that the
federal courts have not been plagued by the conflict suffered in
several of the states where local courts have attempted to mandate
the expenditure of additional monies from the local county boards
that fund them. The best known auxiliary tool for increasing court
finances is the doctrine of "inherent powers." '7 The doctrine holds
See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (19f6) which provides for the authority of the Judicial
Conference and 28 U.S.C. § 605 (1976) which deals with the preparation of the
federal judicial budget.
5 28 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). This section provides that such budget requests "shall
be included in the budget without revision, but subject to the recommendations of
the Office of Management and Budget."
I For an excellent discussion of the powers of state executive officials to review
and revise judicial budget requests, see BAAR, SsEARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT: COUT
BUDGErNG IN THE AhmcAN STATES 25-54 (1975).
7 This theory was expounded forcefully by Colorado Supreme Court Justice
Carrigan when he was a Denver attorney. See Carrigan, Inherent Powers of the
Courts, 24 Juv. JUST. 38 (1973). See also J. CARouGAN, NATIONAL COLLEGE OF STATE
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that the constitutional necessity for an independent judiciary im-
plies an inherent power in the courts to mandate that those who
control the purse will provide the courts with the funds necessary
to exercise the judicial function. Inherent powers lawsuits have
been successful on the local level to secure funding for supplies and
other relatively minor expenses, but they have not been used at the
state level nor proved successful at the local level when large ex-
penditures are at issue.8
In the final analysis, regardless of the forceful legal theory
behind inherent powers lawsuits, they have typically been utilized
only as last resorts, when negotiations with municipal budget offi-
cials offer no hope for compromise.' That they must be used at all
is unfortunate. Attempting to meet judicial needs by legal man-
date inhibits planning, frustrates the development and considera-
tion of sound budgetary policies, and sows conflict where there
should be cooperation." Similarly inflexible is a proposal made
several years ago by the late Michigan Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Kavanaugh, which would have imposed rigidity on judicial
TRIL JUDGES OUTLINE ON INHERENT POWERS OF TRAL COURTS To PROVIDE NEEDED
COURT PERSONNEL, FAcIErms AND EQuiphENT (4th Rev. 1968), reprinted in INsTiTUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE AND LoCAL FINANCING OF THE COURTS app. C
(Tentative Report 1969).
8 Mention should be made of the recent opinion by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship, 246 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va.
1978). At issue was the legislature's action reducing the judicial budget. The West
Virginia Constitution provides that "no item [in the budget bill] relating to the
judiciary shall be decreased. . ." W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(B). When the legisla-
ture reduced five of the six items in the judicial budget request, and the Governor
signed the bill, two citizens of West Virginia, as attorneys and taxpayers of the
state, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the clerk of the House of Delegates to
print a budget bill with the items restored. The court recognized, as did the judici-
ary in submitting the budget, that judicial salaries were subject to legislative ap-
proval and therefore that requested monies for salaries could be ministerially ad-
justed in light of legislative action to set the salaries, 246 S.E.2d 99 at 109, but the
Court held that any other reductions were prohibited by the plain language of the
Constitution. To the defense that the judicial budget lost its constitutional protec-
tion because it sought funds not reasonably necessary for its efficient and effective
operations, the court responded that in West Virginia "the inherent power of the
judiciary to determine what funds are necessary for its efficient and effective opera-
tions is substantiated by express provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 110. (In its
opinion, the Court also disposed of other issues, including the requested disqualifi-
cation of one member of the specially-composed Court, and certain pretrial discov-
ery matters.)
BAAR, supra note 6, at 143-49.
tO Hazard, McNamara & Sentilles, supra note 2, at 1287-91.
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budgetary management by requiring the state to allocate a fixed
percentage of total state revenues to the judicial branch." The
federal process suggests the advantages of compromise and plan-
ning rather than rigid guidelines and law suits.
A second reason for describing the federal judicial appropria-
tions and budget process is that if there is a continued movement
towards reducing the use of the local property tax to finance essen-
tial government services, operation of the state courts may become
the responsibility of the state rather than the individual county.
If unified judicial budgeting becomes the prevalent trend in the
states, the federal experience can be a helpful model.
A third and final rationale for discussing the federal judicial
appropriations process is simply because the process is crucial to
the maintenance of the federal judicial process. It is evident that
the federal court dockets are literally exploding with perplexing,
sometimes provocative and nearly always complex legal topics. For
example, in 1922, when Chief Justice Taft was urging Congress to
adopt legislation creating what is now the Judicial Conference of
the United States, the Supreme Court received 720 new filings. In
1977, 35 years later, the Court received almost 4,000 new positions,
a sevenfold increase. Similarly, the caseload of the United States
Court of Appeals has increased from 1,800 in 1922 to over 18,000
in 1976. Bankruptcy case filings have increased from 38,000 in 1922
to more than 246,000 in 1976. The criminal caseload of the District
Courts has decreased from almost 61,000 defendants in 1922 to
53,000 defendants in 1976, but this is a statistical anomaly brought
about by the repeal of prohibition." If these numerous prohibition
cases are not counted, the growth in criminal cases parallels the
overall growth of the federal court caseload.
Accordingly, the federal courts system, especially the trial
courts, must be responsive to the continuing growth of American
society. At the same time, however, it is crucial that government
expenditures be strictly monitored and restricted only to necessary
programs. Let us now turn to a description of the little known
judicial appropriations process that contributes so vitally to these
ends.
" Discussed in BMR, supra note 6, at 159-60.
12 In the 1920's and early 1930's the criminal caseload of the District Courts
was composed mostly of prohibition cases. These cases were processed much in the
same expeditious manner that traffic violations are handled today.
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I. THE JuDcuLL BUDGOT - HSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
To understand the background of the federal judicial appro-
priations process, we must retreat to the year 1922 when the Con-
gress, at the urging of Chief Justice William Howard Taft, created
the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, now known as the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States. 3 Until 1922 the Supreme
Court was the only organization within the federal judiciary that
considered administrative problems facing the federal courts.
Needless to say, the Court was, and still is, ill-equipped to perform
these administrative tasks. It was Chief Justice Taft's idea that an
annual meeting of the senior circuit judges would provide a forum
that could address these problems in an institutional manner. The
Conference was also given the authority to submit recommenda-
tions to the Congress regarding the needs of the courts.
In the Judicial Conference's early years, the Attorney General
of the United States met with the Conference and handled some
of its administrative affairs-at least those that could not be han-
dled directly by the Chief Justice. This included preparation of the
judicial budget, thus giving rise to a situation whereby the major
litigator in the courts was also its budget officer. It soon became
apparent, however, that the Judicial Conference and the federal
judiciary should have its own administrative arm available on a
full-time basis to deal with matters affecting the judiciary.
Finally, in 1939, nine years after Chief Justice Taft had been
succeeded in office by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Con-
gress'passed the Administrative Office Act of 1939,11 creating the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and giving the
Judicial Conference the managerial support necessary for adminis-
tering the affairs of the judiciary. The Administrative Office now
functions with a permanent staff of approximately 450, all based
in Washington, D.C.'5 Probably more important than any provi-
sion in the legislation creating the Administrative Office was the
requirement that the Director of the Administrative Office "under
the supervision of the conference of senior circuit judges, shall
,3 The original creation was by Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 838.
In 1948, the name was changed in a general codification of federal judicial provi-
sions; see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 15, § 331, 62 Stat. 902. Statutory authority for
the judicial conference is now found at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976).
14 Ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-611(1976)).
11 For a brief discussion of the Administrative Office, see GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. GovERNENrr ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1978/79 86-87.
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prepare and submit annually ... estimates of.the expenditures
and appropriations necessary for the maintenance and operation
of the United States courts. . ., and such supplemental and defi-
ciency estimates as may be required from time to time ... "I'
The budget had to have the Judicial Conference's approval and
then, it was to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, now the
Office of Management and Budget, to be "included in the Budget
of the United States without revision. ' 17 These provisions remain
unchanged in their mandate. 8
II. PREPARING THE BUDGET FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Currently the work of preparing the budget for the federal
judiciary commences in the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts about 18 months prior to the start of the fiscal year
for which the funds are to be allocated. Information on the courts'
budgetary needs based upon current and projected workloads is
accumulated, and then is submitted by the Director of the Admin-
istrative Office to the Judicial Conference's Committee on the
Budget. The Committee, composed of federal district and appel-
late judges, is chaired by the Honorable Robert E. Maxwell, Chief
Judge of the Northern District of West Virginia. This committee
studies these proposals and puts the total budget in final form,
prior to its submission for approval by the Judicial Conference.
This arrangement permits the various constituent units of the
federal judiciary to debate and discuss among themselves what
needs should be addressed in the budget request. One would not
expect that all elements of the judiciary would have exactly the
same view of how the federal judicial budget priorities should be
ranked. However, this unitary budgeting system allows those var-
ious elements to debate and discuss overall judicial budget policy
in a professional fashion. It stands in contrast to state systems in
which judges throughout the state must convince separate funding
sources on the local and state levels of their needs. As Professor
Hazard and his colleagues observe, under unitary budgeting, the
judges must assert their needs "by influencing the court adminis-
trator, chief justice, or planning committee of his fellow judges.
This, in turn, implies a change in the types of persuasion that will
,1 Administrative Office Act of 1939, ch. 501, § 305, 53 Stat. 1223.
Id.
" See current version at 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1976).
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prove influential, with greater weight given to professional and
administratively rational considerations."'"
Once the budget requests are approved by the Judicial Confer-
ence, they are then submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). This agency is charged with the responsibility of
preparing the national budget, which is submitted by the Presi-
dent to the Congress in January of each year, to cover government
operations during the fiscal year beginning the following October.
Under the Federal Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,0 as
amended, the OMB has the authority to review requests submitted
by executive agencies of government to determine whether the
requests for funds are in accord with the overall national program
of the President. In this regard the OMB performs the essential
function of control over budget requests and has the authority to
modify or reduce requests of individual agencies before submission
to the Congress."' Excepted from the OMB's power to modify are
requests from the federal judiciary and from the Congress itself,
although the agency does have the authority to comment on these
requests. As mentioned above, this author cannot recall that the
OMB has ever exercised its right under the law to comment on the
budget of the federal judiciary.
H. THE WORK OF THE JuDniAL APPROPRIATION SUBCOMMITTEES
After the annual budget is submitted by the President to the
Congress in January of each year, congressional review of the
budget begins. Under the present organization of Congress, the
Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives and
the Appropriations Committee of the Senate are responsible for
considering budget requests and for making recommendations to
the two full houses of Congress. In turn, the Appropriations Com-
mittees have been broken down into subcommittees which exam-
ine various parts of the total national budget and make recommen-
dations to the full Appropriations Committees and, ultimately, to
the Congress. The subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee which is charged with examining the budget of the
federal judiciary is the Subcommittee on the Department of State,
" Hazard, McNamara & Sentilles, supra note 2, at 1300.
Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (current version at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1-61, 71, 471, 581, 5681a
(1976)).
21 See 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 605 (1976).
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Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary and Related Agencies; the
Senate subcommittee is also named the Subcommittee on the
Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary and
Related Agencies.
The judicial appropriation subcommittees hold hearings in
which the Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the
Budget and the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts are summoned to appear to give testimony and sub-
mit justification for the funds requested. Several Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States appear to explain the Court's
request, and the Director of the Federal Judicial Center (the fed-
eral courts' research and development agency) appears on behalf
of the Center.
Written justifications will have been submitted to Congress
weeks in advance of the actual hearing, and they are reviewed by
the members of the subcommittees and their professional staff.
Because of this advance study and preparation, the hearings focus
upon matters of concern to subcommittee members, which are
predominately requests for funds needed to cope with increased
workloads and new functions imposed upon the judiciary by law.
Reviewing each of the separate appropriation items, and the writ-
ten and oral justifications presented in support of them, is a sub-
stantial endeavor for each member of the subcommittees and the
staff assistants.
Because the federal judicial budget is comparatively small,
some may think it. is passed over rather cursorily. It takes, for
example, over four times as much money (over $2 billion) to oper-
ate the Department of Justice as to operate the entire third branch
of government. However, this author cautions against the cavalier
assumption that legislators can meet their obligations if they re-
view a budget of a half-billion dollars on a "once-over-lightly
basis." The federal judicial budget proposal is a statement of the
funding necessary to allow the federal judiciary to implement the
constitutional promise of equal justice under law. It is prepared
carefully and thoughtfully by the judiciary, and it deserves, and it
receives, careful and thoughtful consideration by the Congress.
IV. A GENERAL BREAKDOWN OF THE FEDERAL JUDIcIARY's BUDGET
The budget for the federal judiciary totals approximatery $490
9
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million for fiscal year 1979.1 Over 90% of the appropriation, or
more than $450 million, is for the support and maintenance of the
United States Courts of Appeals and United States District
Courts. Approximately $40 million of this appropriation goes to
pay the salaries of judges and $166 million for the salaries of the
courts' support personnel including law clerks, secretaries, clerks
and deputy clerks of court, probation officers and other clerical
assistants. Fees of jurors amount to $20 million annually; the sala-
ries and expenses of public defenders, and fees paid to court-
appointed counsel in criminal cases involving indigent defendants
aggregate $25 million. The miscellaneous expenses of the courts,
including travel, telephone and other communications, stationery,
forms, supplies and equipment total almost $32 million. Salaries
and expenses of United States Magistrates are $19.4 million and
the salaries and expenses of referees in bankruptcy total $35 mil-
lion. These figures illustrate that the bulk of the federal judicial
appropriations is consumed by the courts that handle the greatest
caseload.
Other costs round out the picture. The cost of operating the
Supreme Court is over $11 million, including $1.5 million appropri-
ated to the Architect of the Capitol for maintenance of the Court's
building and grounds. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
received an appropriation of about $1 million; and the Court of
Claims and the Customs Court are allocated approximately $3
million and $3.5 million respectively. The remaining 4% of the
budget is consumed by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, which received $12.25 million, and the Federal Ju-
dicial Center, which was allocated $8 million. Approximately $107
million is allocated to pay rent for courtrooms, court facilities,
furniture and furnishings.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts are properly regarded as the cornerstone of a so-
ciety that prizes individual justice. Noble goals, however, are
empty goals without attention to the development of sound and
systematic administrative methods that are necessary to turn goals
The judiciary's basic appropriations for the 1979 fiscal year (not including
supplemental appropriations) are contained in the Department of State, Justice
and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1979,
Pub. L. No. 95-431, 92 Stat. 102, approved by the President on October 10, 1978.
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into reality. The federal judicial budget process provides the op-
portunity for reasoned analysis, compromise, and negotiation,
within the context of competing national priorities requiring the
appropriation of public monies.
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